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1 THE PROCESS AND PERFORMANCE OF DECENTRALIZATION OF RIVER 




1 has become one of the most debated reform issues in many sectors around the 
world in recent years.  On the one hand it is argued (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1999; Conyers, 
1984; Shah, 1998; Wallis and Oates, 1988) that by having the service receivers part of the 
decision making process, the service provider—in most cases central governments—responds 
better and in an equitable manner to local needs, and thus, efficiency gains from lower 
transaction cost are realized.  On the other hand, others (Smith, 1985; Wandschneider, 1984) 
argue that lack of local capacity, diseconomies of scale, and politics of local interest groups will 
make provision of decentralized services inefficient.  Recently, Sigman (2005) asserts that 
decentralization of water quality regulations may be associated with externality costs when 
pollution crosses the borders of the decentralized jurisdictions.  In a somewhat similar vein, 
Howe (2005:26) argues that “…breaking up river basins among many jurisdictions, most having 
nothing to do with water”, leads to “jurisdictional externalities”.  The examples used by Sigman 
(2005) and Howe (2005) refer to transboundary river basins (see footnote 7), either in a federal 
country (e.g., USA) or in an international setting.  We would argue and try to show in this paper 
(for river basin) that whether or not decentralized services are more efficient or less costly than 
those associated with centralized provision is an empirical question, depending on, for example, 
initial conditions, scale, type of decentralized services, and other factors. 
  Water, an increasingly scarce resource around the world, has been usually (mis)managed 
by governments, leading to several social and economic problems, including degradation in its 
quality and reduction in the level of services it provides.  In the case of river basin water resource 
management, there have been problems stemming from the common pool nature of the resource 
and the existence of severe externalities from its use by individuals and sectors in various parts 
                                                 
1 Decentralization is usually defined as a redistribution of authority and allocation of resources with more power 
being shifted away from the central or national level to lower levels of government.   
2 of the basin.  With central management often lacking appropriate incentive structures and 
imposing high transaction costs of management, these problems have been exacerbated, leading 
to recognition of a need for a paradigm shift in river basin water resource management. 
  One of the major components of the recent water reforms at the basin level is the 
decentralization of basin water resources management to the lowest appropriate level, as widely 
advocated in the Dublin Principles (ICWE, 1992:4), by the World Bank’s Water Resources 
Policy Paper (World Bank, 1993:18), and by the Global Water Partnership working paper (GWP, 
2000).  The lowest appropriate level usually implies the involvement of stakeholders in the basin, 
including water users.  On the one hand, decentralization is the devolution of authority and 
accountability from the central to lower levels of government.  Clearly, this form of 
decentralization is likely to vary across countries according to their size and governance 
structure.  Moreover, when power is devolved, overlapping functions across authorities and 
competition between them have to be considered.  Yet another dimension of decentralization is 
the extent to which users and other stakeholders participate in the decision making process.  
Devolution of power to lower levels of government and stakeholder participation may go 
together but that need not always be the case.  Following Wallis and Oates (1988) we take 
Decentralization of river basin water resource management
2 to mean the shift of decision making 
responsibility to water users or governmental units at the basin scale or below.  Such 
decentralization reforms are usually promoted for the purposes of increasing transparency and 
stakeholder participation in decision making, which are expected to result in improved water 
resource management outcomes.  We would state here that river basin is clearly not the lowest 
level to which responsibilities for water resource management can be decentralized (Howe 
2005).  However, since we confined our study to the river basin scale, then the river basin is the 
lowest level to which its management can be decentralized. 
  Decentralization of water resource management from centralized national administration 
to the basin level is an important aspect of reform agendas, with governments and international 
development organizations, such as the World Bank, funding projects with decentralization 
                                                 
2 From hereafter we use ‘decentralization of river basin water resource management’ interchangeably with ‘river 
basin management decentralization’ and ‘river basin decentralization’. 
3 components (Figure 1).  However, evaluation of such major investments has not been performed 
and lack of understanding of both the decentralization process and its performance hamper the 
possible improvements of similar investments in the future. 
  The documented decentralization reforms of river basin water resource management do 
not address process and performance aspects.  The common approach is a case study of a single 
or a few basins (Kemper and Olson, 2000; Zusman, 2000; Reynoso, 2000; Merrey, 2000; Ioris, 
2001; Koppel, 1987; Udofia, 1988; and Blomquist et al., 2005).  While the case study analyses 
highlight the direction in decentralization of river basin management, they do not permit the 
identification of generic reasons and forces behind decentralization process and performance.   
Since rigorous analysis of decentralization of river basin management that is not specific 
or descriptive is rare, we consulted works that evaluate decentralization in other sectors (Mody 
2004; Faguet, 2004; Cerniglia, 2003; Panizza, 1999; Humplick and Estache, 1995).  The work by 
Faguet (2004) and Cerniglia (2003) in particular address, at a different scale and context, 
research questions that coincide with ours.  Faguet (2004) examines whether decentralization 
increased the responsiveness of public investment to local needs in 10 sectors in Bolivia.   
Cerniglia (2003) investigates the determinants and the performance of fiscal decentralization in 
16 OECD countries with specific focus on federal vs. unitary countries.  A common phenomenon 
in these studies is that they rely on existing datasets and thus, need to adapt and restrict their set 
of empirical variables to that in the dataset they obtained. 
  In this paper we develop an empirical framework based, in part, on an analytical 
framework developed in Blomquist et al. (2005), Cerniglia (2003), and Faguet (2004).  The 
framework permits a quantitative estimate of the relationships that explain processes and 
performances of river basin decentralization reforms.  As we could not get an existing data set 
that fits our analytical framework, we developed a questionnaire that was administered to collect 
data, which we then analyzed to test our hypotheses.  The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: the next section presents the analytical framework and the hypotheses we will test.  
Section II presents the data collection and manipulation procedures.  Section III presents and 
justifies the empirical models we constructed, and section IV reports the results of the analysis.  
The conclusion suggests lessons for both researchers dealing with assessing progress in 
4 institutional reform and for policy makers dealing with decentralization of river basin 
management and other related sectors. 
2. Analytical Framework and Hypotheses  
We start with the observation that “the lowest appropriate levels” for river basin water resource 
management vary between basins, i.e. while full decentralization of decision-making can be 
optimal in one case, it can be destructive in others.  Therefore, our framework incorporates 
factors such as basin size, hydrology, socio-economic conditions, governance and cultural and 
historical conditions in each basin (see also Saleth and Dinar, 2004:242-260). 
  In addition to the specific local context of the decentralization process, an important issue 
to address is what to measure and how to measure it.  Decentralization of decision-making is not 
an aim per se.  It is recommended because experience suggests that when decision-making is 
centralized and local conditions are not taken appropriately into account, then accountability of 
decision makers is weak, and water resources management is hampered. 
Decentralization can be seen as a reform process and as such, other processes that occur 
in parallel may affect it.  For example, forces initiating and affecting the decentralization process 
stem from societal structure, interests leading to the reform (top down or bottom up), and rules 
governing the initiation and approval of organizational change among others (as discussed at 
length in Blomquist et al., 2005).  Furthermore, the concept of path dependency plays a major 
role in the process of institutional reform (Saleth and Dinar, 2004:264).  The process by which 
decentralization measures are introduced is expected to affect implementation and performance.  
The costs and benefits encountered by different stakeholders as well as power relations between 
them are also important variables in our analytical framework (Saleth and Dinar, 2004, Chapter 
4).  Our analytical framework thus takes into account (a) the existing institutional framework, (b) 
the decentralization process, (c) the basin political economy and (d) the decentralization results.   
  As institutional analysts have studied natural resource management in general—and in 
some instances, water resource management in particular—they have identified causes and 
patterns of interactionamong groups and individuals.  Much of this work is summarized in 
Bromley (1989), Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al. (1994).  Key considerations identified in the 
literature include: (a) asymmetries of power, information, or other resource distribution among 
5 individuals; (b) Past interactions among individuals and their anticipations concerning future 
interactions; (c) the extent to which individuals are allowed or encouraged to innovate, 
experiment, and pursue trial-and-error learning with respect to institutional arrangements; (d) 
social (or otherwise derived) norms of trust and reciprocity; and (e) cultural or other differences 
among the individuals who are attempting to coordinate behavior or whose cooperation is 
needed.  Ee have transformed those broad categories into empirical variables, and formulated 
hypotheses about how each variable might contribute to the likelihood of successful or 
unsuccessful decentralization of river basin management. 
2.1. The Hypotheses 
We start by postingour research questions: (1) What is the role of historical and situational 
variables on the level of stakeholder involvement in the management of the basin, and if such 
active involvement of stakeholders is secured, how can it be translated into more effective 
resource management and higher performance level compared to the situation prior to 
decentralization?  (2) If stakeholder involvement is translated into basin-level management, how 
can the active involvement and effective resource management be sustained over time and 
changing conditions?  (3) What factors might account for the longevity of decentralized 
arrangements in some cases and their demise in others? 
  Guided by these research questions, our analytical framework helped identifying four sets 
of variables under the major headings (a) Impact of contextual factors and initial conditions; (b) 
Characteristics of the decentralization process; (c) Characteristics of central government/basin-
level relationships and capacities; and (d) The internal configuration of basin-level institutional 
arrangements.  For each set we develop a list of empirical variables that could capture expected 
relationship to decentralization process and performance. 
2.1.1. Impact of Contextual Factors and Initial Conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that the outcome of 
decentralization is partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the time a 
decentralization initiative is attempted (path dependency).  These initial conditions are elements 
of the economic, political and social context of the decentralization effort.  Several variables that 
capture such conditions are detailed below. 
6   Level of economic development of the river basin region measures the ability of the basin 
stakeholders to commit financial and other resources necessary to the decentralization process in 
addition to central government provision of support for the decentralization effort.  Successful 
decentralization must include some degree of financial autonomy (Cerniglia, 2003; Musgrave, 
1997).
 3  Sustaining this financial autonomy often depends upon establishing some form of water 
pricing or tariffs, having the users obey such payments, and having the proceeds remain within 
or return to the basin to support the decentralization effort.  This in turn implies that basins that 
have a level of economic development which can sustain those resource commitments are (all 
other things being equal) more likely to achieve sustainable success in decentralization. 
 Population  density measures also the level of development of the basin.  Basins with 
more population per unit of land face more development problems and are likely to be involved 
in reforms such as decentralization (Cerniglia, 2003).  We would expect that higher levels of 
population density is likely to lead to decentralization and to more successful decentralization.  
  Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders affects the development of and 
the prospect for successful implementation of a decentralization initiative.  On the one hand, 
extreme disparities in resource endowments among basin stakeholders can imperil 
decentralization success (Becker, 1983; Dinar, 2003).  On the other hand (and less obviously), 
some inequality of initial resource endowments may facilitate action by enabling some 
stakeholders to bear the costs of taking a leadership role (Blomquist, 1988; Ostrom, 1990).   
Cerniglia (2003) used a similar argument that the more unequal the distribution of income, the 
more decentralized the public sector.  Extreme inequality, however, may be detrimental or even 
derail the decentralization effort.  The relationship between level of inequality of resource 
endowments and successful decentralization is hill-shaped, with greatest positive impact at a 
certain level of inequality and lower or negative impacts at both lower and higher levels of 
inequality of resource endowment distribution. 
                                                 
3 We should mention in this context the level of economic development of the nation as another possible variable 
explaining successful decentralization.  However, unlike in Cerniglia (2003), where this variable is used to explain 
level of national fiscal decentralization efforts, or even in the case of water institutional reform in Australia 
(Musgrave, 1997), river basin decentralization does not necessarily occur on a national scale and thus it may be less 
appropriate to a-priori use economic development level of the nation to explain decentralization performance. 
7 2.1.2. Characteristics of the decentralization process 
Certain conditions or characteristics of the decentralization process itself may affect the 
prospects for successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization 
initiative include (a) a devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) an 
acceptance of that authority and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) and (b) 
both occur will depend, in part, upon why and how the decentralization takes place. 
  Top-down, bottom-up, or mutually desired devolution characterize the decentralization 
initiative.  In some cases, central government may have undertaken resource management 
decentralization initiatives in order to solve its own problems—e.g., to reduce or eliminate the 
central government’s political accountability for policy failures and resolve budgetary crisis 
(Simon 2002).  In other cases it is “bottom up” pressure from the stakeholders that leads to the 
decentralization (Samad, 2005).  In still other cases, the decision to decentralize resource 
management to a lower and more appropriate level may have been the outcome of a process of 
mutual discussion and agreement between central officials and local stakeholders, each achieving 
their own goals.  All other things being equal, we anticipate that because decentralization 
initiatives require active basin-level stakeholder involvement, they are more likely to be 
implemented successfully under bottom up pressures and mutual agreement. 
  Existing local-level governance arrangements contribute to continuation.  
Decentralization initiatives are more likely to be accompanied by active involvement of basin 
stakeholders if existing community-level (village, tribe) governance institutions and practices are 
recognized and incorporated in the decentralization process (Ostrom, 1990; Derman et al., 2000; 
Faguet, 2004)).  This is mainly due to transaction costs (primarily in terms of time and effort) to 
basin stakeholders that are likely to be smaller than the transaction costs of having new sets of 
basin-level organizations.  It is not to say that no new institutions will have to be created in order 
to achieve basin-scale management—in fact, new institutions will often be needed to promote 
communication and integrate decision making across communities within a river basin (Galasso 
and Ravallion, 2000).  All other things being equal, decentralization initiatives are more likely to 
succeed in gaining stakeholder acceptance if based upon, and constructed from existing 
traditional community governance institutions and practices. 
 
8 2.1.3. Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central government 
and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be expected to affect that 
success.  Accordingly, our framework includes a set of political and institutional variables 
having to do with the respective capacities of the central government and the basin-level 
stakeholders, and with the relationship between them.  
  Local autonomy in institutional reform is the extent to which local communities can 
design and implement their own institutional arrangements.  It is a key element to the success of 
decentralization.  Successful implementation of decentralization is likely to be a function of that 
local autonomy, because implementation costs are closely associated with information that is 
better obtained at the local level, and because stakeholder involvement is expected to be greater 
in crafting their own institutions.  However, as stakeholders create more institutional 
arrangements (particularly organizations and agencies), they incur greater transaction costs in 
maintaining them and coordinating their activities (Oechssler, 1997).  All other things being 
equal, we expect successful and sustainable implementation of decentralization initiatives more 
often in settings where local-level stakeholders are empowered to craft and modify institutional 
arrangements for resource management at the basin and sub-basin levels  (including cross-
jurisdictional arrangements). 
  Economic, political and social differences among basin users.  In many countries, the 
distribution of political influence is a function of economic, religious, or other social and cultural 
characteristics.  Yet, even if it were not for the connection between such characteristics and 
political influence, the characteristics themselves may affect implementation of decentralization 
initiatives through their independent effects on stakeholder communication, trust, and extent of 
experience in interdependent endeavors (Becker, 1983).  The greater and more contentious these 
distinctions, all other things being equal, the more difficult it will be to develop and sustain 
basin-scale institutional arrangements for governing and managing water resources. 
4  W e  
                                                 
4 It is important to add that these are empirical, not prescriptive, observations.  Central government officials cannot 
make distinctions among basin-level stakeholders disappear.  Nor should central government officials selectively 
apply decentralization policies only in relatively homogeneous settings. 
9 should mention however, that Cerniglia (2003) showed that diversity in terms of religious 
homogeneity and ethno-linguistic homogeneity lead to more decentralized public sector. 
  Country governance structure impacts decentralization reforms including those in river 
basins.  We hypothesize that federal countries will perform better in decentralization reforms 
because federal countries, which present a lower degree of centralization than unitary countries, 
have the fiscal and other decentralized policy regulations already in place (Cerniglia, 2003).  
With all other things being equal, we would expect that decentralization in basins located in 
federal countries is more likely to succeed than in basins located in unitary countries. 
  Adequate time for implementation and adaptation.  Time is needed to develop, 
experiment and practice basin-scale institutional arrangements, to build trust among the parties 
involved; and also to translate resource management plans into observable and sustained effects 
on resource conditions.  The relationship between time and success in water resource 
management is complicated.  While we have already argued that adaptability is important, 
allowing response to changing conditions, time is important, too—changing institutions quickly 
because a new approach has not succeeded can simply erode stakeholders’ willingness to commit 
their time and effort to the next reform.  A curvilinear relationship may exist, where successful 
implementation is less likely to be observed among decentralization initiatives that are very 
young, but is more likely among initiatives with longer periods. However, it is likely to taper off 
if basin-level arrangements have proved insufficiently adaptable over long periods. 
2.1.4. The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management may also depend on 
features of the basin arrangements created by stakeholders and/or by the central government.   
  Presence of some basin-level governance institutions may be a necessary condition for 
successful decentralized water resource management.  Basin-level governance—allowing 
stakeholders articulate their interests, share information, communicate and bargain, and take 
collective decisions—is essential to the ability of water users to operate at multiple levels of 
action, which is a key to sustaining successful resource preservation and efficient use (Ostrom, 
1990).  Basin-level water resource management (in other words, a decentralized system) is 
neither achievable nor sustainable without the establishment and maintenance of basin-level 
governance arrangements.  Because the existence of governance arrangements is a necessary, 
10 not sufficient, condition of successful resource management, we should not expect to find success 
everywhere we find basin-level governance institutions, but it would be more likely to find failure 
where they are absent. 
  Mechanisms for conflict resolution are needed to prevent disagreements from worsening.  
Resource users can and will disagree on many issues, including how well their interests are being 
represented and protected, how well the resource management program is working and whether 
it is time for a change, and on the distribution of benefits and costs.  The success and 
sustainability of decentralized resource management efforts therefore also depend on the 
presence of forums for addressing conflicts.  All other things being equal, we would expect 
successful implementation of decentralized water resource management more likely in settings 
where forums for conflict resolution exist. 
2.1.5. General hypotheses 
We will also infer several general hypotheses suggested by the decentralization literature.  First, 
we will infer whether or not various decentralization process characteristics and performance 
differ between developed and developing countries.  Mody (2004) suggests several reasons for 
such differences, including existing governance, capacity, and financial resources in developed 
countries.  Second, we will also infer whether or not national wealth and basin wealth (see 
footnote 3) impact positively the performance of the decentralization process (Cerniglia, 2003).  
Third, we will infer whether or not the size of the basin affects both the process and the 
performance of the decentralization (Cerniglia, 2003).  Finally, we will infer the hill shaped 
relationship of several dependent variables.  Following Dinar and Dinar (2005), water scarcity 
level in a basin is expected to have a hill shaped relationship with low levels of scarcity and high 
levels of scarcity associated with lower decentralization performance levels.  Based on our 
analytical framework, we will infer also the hill shaped relationships between variables 
representing distribution of endowments among basin stakeholders and the decentralization 
performance. 
3. Data, variable construction, and analytical techniques 
In order to infer the hypothesized impact of the above variables on the process and performance 
of river basin decentralization, we applied several statistical tests to data collected from 83 river 
11 basins around the world (Figure 2).  A survey instrument was developed and pre-tested on 25 
river basin organizations (RBOs) prior to being modified, translated into English, Spanish, 
French and Portuguese and sent to a total of 197 known RBOs around the world that underwent 
decentralization.  In addition to land mail and email venues, a website with the survey
5  was 
created to facilitate online responses.  Data collection was completed after an iterative process of 
data entry and quality assurance reviews.  Additional rudimentary statistical tests were 
undertaken to identify, verify and correct outliers.   
The questionnaires were filled by staff from the basins.  As such, answers to questions 
that address performance could be seen, a-priori as subjective, and potentially biased.  However, 
given the length of the decentralization process (up to 36 years), staff had been replaced and thus 
we are not concerned about biased responses to performance of decentralization.  In addition, we 
are comfortable with our sample size, with the various measurements of decentralization success, 
and with the use of a variety of statistical methodologies to best explain the responses.  And 
finally, as correctly indicated by Alderman (2002) local authorities appear to both have access to 
information that is not easily captured in surveys.   
  Questionnaires from 103 RBOs (52% response rate) were returned.  After reviewing all 
responses and completeness and accuracy of data, questionnaires of 20 basins were removed 
from the dataset because they could not be corrected.  Therefore 83 responses from basins in 27 
countries comprise the final dataset (Table 1).
6, 7   
3.1. Variable Construction 
Our questionnaire consisted of 47 questions and 226 primary variables.  A description of the 
variables included in the analysis appears in the Annex to the paper, and a detailed explanation 
                                                 
5 www.worldbank.org/riverbasinmanagement 
6 To our knowledge this is the largest dataset of information about decentralization of river basin organizations 
worldwide that is currently in existence. 
7 Transboundary riverbasin management processes are significantly different from similar processes in national 
basins. For this reason, a decision was taken to not include transboundary basins in the analysis.  Three basins that 
could be considered transboundary were included, however, because they were either mostly contained in one 
country or featured a river basin organization that had been developed only in one country.  We conducted separate 
analyses for the entire dataset and for the dataset consisting on the 81 domestic basins, but results are identical, and 
not presented. 
12 and description of each variable is provided in Annex 3 in Dinar et al (2005).  Some of the 
variables in our data set are naturally correlated to each other.  We conduct several Principal 
Component (PC) Analyses in order to capture the information these variables provide and 
prevent possible multicollinearity, by combining a set of primary variables into one inclusive PC 
variable in our estimated relationships.  We also used several primary variables to create indices 
to reflect values that are better expressed on a relative rather than on an absolute scale. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section presents the general framework for the econometric analysis of the data with 
empirical specifications adjusted to the variables that were constructed.   
4.1. The Empirical Models 
We are interested in two types of relationships.  The first relationship explains certain aspects of 
the decentralization process.  The second relationship explains level of success/progress of the 
decentralization process. 
  The set of equations used in the estimation of the first relationship takes the form: 
P=g(C, R, I | X) ,              ( 1 )  
where 
P is a vector of characteristics of the decentralization process; 
C  is a vector of contextual factors and initial conditions; 
R is a vector of characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities; 
I is a vector of internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements;  
X is a vector of ‘other’ variables, identified as necessary. 
  A general relationship for decentralization success/progress, using the analytical 
framework developed above is as follows: 
S=f(C, P, R, I | X) ,              ( 2 )  
where S is a measure of performance of the decentralization in the river basin.   
13   Note that equations (1) and (2) can also be estimated as a system, due to the fact that P, 
which is a dependent variable in equation (1), serves as an independent variable in equation (2), 
thus serving as the instrumental variable of the system.  While we believe that variables in P and 
S in (1) and (2) may form a system, we have no reason to assume that some P P ∈  and S S ∈  are 
being determined within the system.  Rather, all P and S variables are assumed to be determenied 
outside of this system and not to be correlated with the error terms of (1) and (2). 
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with all parameters having the same meaning as in equations (1) and (2). 
  We propose several specifications for the functional forms of (1) and (2), depending on 
the nature of the variables S and P used.  One possible way to measure success is by using a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 when decentralization was initiated and 0 when no 
decentralization took place in spite of government intent.  A second way of describing success is 
to measure normatively the extent of achieving several important original goals of the 
decentralization process.  In this case the various RBOs have been ranked on a scale S=[s,s], 
measuring the decentralization success, which allows S to get a range of (integer) values.  A third 
way of measuring progress of decentralization is by comparing performance between post- and 
pre-decentralization periods (Faguet, 2004).  Performance variables may include: level of 
participation, local responsibility, financial performance, economic activity etc.  Using this 
definition, S becomes a continuous variable.  Each of these performance variables is measured 
on different scales and actually comprised of various sub-variables.  A t-test analysis of ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ levels for each sub-variable as well as a PC analysis for each group have been 
performed. 
4.2. Empirical Specifications of the Decentralization Process and its Performance 
We turn now to the hypothesized relationships concerning characteristics of the decentralization 
process (equation (1)).  Several variables (for definitions see Annex) could help shed light on the 
decentralization process.  The length of the decentralization process, Yrs Decentralization, the 
transaction costs of the process, measured by several variables such as Instit Dismantled, Instit 
14 Creaed, Politcal Cost, and the level of involvement of the stakeholders, WUAs Involvement, will 
be used.  We employ different estimation procedures based on the characteristics of the 
dependent variable of each equation. 
  We identify several variables that could measure decentralization success and progress.  
We use the variables Success Obj1 to reflect achievement of various goals the decentralization 
process was aimed to achieve.  A GLM procedure is applied because the dependent variable is 
truncated varying between 0 and an upper value.  We also construct several additional variables 
that measure decentralization progress: Problems Aftr,  Incremental Tasks,  Incremental 
Improvement, and Improved Responsibility (See Annex), that are not truncated and thus an OLS 
estimation procedure is used for the estimations of their relationship with other independent 
variables. 
Finally, we estimate two equation systems to capture the process-progress interaction.  
The dependent variable for decentralization process is WUAs Involvement in both systems.  The 
dependent variables for decentralization progress are Problems Aftr and Improved Responsibility, 
in System 1 and 2, respectively. 
4.3. Channels of Impact 
Once we estimate the various relationships of decentralization process and progress, we can 
capture the total impact of a marginal change in each of the explanatory variables on the 
performance of the decentralization process.  We create the performance equation, based on the 
system (3), by substituting P in equation (1) into equation (2) and obtaining equation (4), 
) , , ), , , , ( , ( X I R X I R C e C h S =          ( 4 )  
  Then, by applying the chain derivative rule, we obtain for each dependent variable a path 
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  Given our estimates of the coefficients of the various dependent variables in the system 
equations we are able also to quantify the overall impact of each variable on the performance 
level of the decentralization process. 
5. Results 
The distribution of the RBOs in our dataset reflects actual decentralization reforms that took place 
in the various continents, with the Latin America continent leading in that respect.  Of the 83 basins, 
51 are located in developing countries and 43 are in countries with unitary regimes.
8   
  An important phase in our variable construction was the Princpal Component analysis.  
The eigenvectors of the first principal components used in the creation of the principal 
component variables are presented in table 6 in Dinar et al. (2005).  These eigenvectors explain 
between 25 and 99 percent of the standardized variance among the primary variables.  The 
primary and constructed PC variables employed in the analysis, and their descriptive statistics, 
are presented in the Annex of this paper.  
5.1. Inference of General Hypotheses 
The results of the models that tested our general hypotheses indicate no significant difference 
between developing and developed countries in the equations describing both process and 
performance of the decentralization process.  The physical size of the basin, the wealth of the 
nation, and the wealth of the basin were not found significant in explaining differences in the 
                                                 
8 This distribution reflects the efforts, especially in Latin America in recent years, to implement decentralized river 
basin water resource management.  Basin management is now being pursued throughout Europe as well, as EU 
members and candidate states attempt to comply with the Water Framework Directive. 
16 decentralization process and its performance.  Furthermore, the hypothesized hill shaped 
behavior of the variables Scarcity1 and that of the basin resource distribution, measured by 
Sector Use Shares could not be inferred.  These results are therefore not presented, but can be 
obtained from the authors upon request. 
5.2. Is Water Managed indeed at a Lower Level (Comparing Before and After Results) 
We assess progress of decentralization by comparing levels of several sets of 
responsibility/management indicators before and after decentralization, using a two-tailed t-test.  
Water management decisions are made at roughly local, basin, state, and federal levels.  We 
would expect that more decisions are made at lower levels after decentralization compared with 
before decentralization.  We refer to the share of management decisions that were made at 
various levels and compare these shares before and after decentralization.  The management 
decisions relate to general administration of the basin; infrastructure investment and 
management; water quality monitoring and enforcement; and setting water quality standards 
(Table 2).  An additional indicator compared the level of responsibility (local, basin, state, or 
federal) for water rights, water allocation, modeling-forecasting, monitoring, and tariff collection 
before and after decentralization (Table 3). 
  As expected, after decentralization the share of decisions made at federal and state levels 
decreased and the share of decisions at local level increased significantly in most cases (Table 2) 
in all categories (administration, infrastructure financing, water quality standard setting and 
enforcement), showing a greater involvement of local stakeholders.  When shares of state level 
involvement increased, this change was not significant.  In the case of responsibility shift (Table 
3), we found that in all management items, responsibility was taken over by lower level decision 
makers in the process of decentralization.  However, on average, for none of the items analyzed 
the responsibility reached local or basin levels after decentralization.  In addition, water 
allocation activities have not changed significantly compared to the other three activities in Table 
3.  Our interpretation is that water allocation is the most politically important activity most 
fraught with vested interests, and therefore, most difficult to decentralize. 
5.3. The Decentralization Process 
We estimated several relationships that could explain the characteristics of the decentralization 
process in terms of its length, complexity and participation of stakeholders.  We include several 
17 equations representing various aspects of the decentralization process in Table 4.  The equations 
incorporate variables measuring the creation and dismantling of institutions, the involvement of 
water user groups, the political cost of the decentralization process and the length of the 
decentralization process.  Generally, the signs of the explanatory variables used in the analysis 
are consistent with our expectations.  Fit and significant tests of the models suggest that all are 
significant at the 5 percent level (and better) in explaining the variation in the level of the various 
decentralization process indicators.   
Certain variables, such as the percentage of users in the irrigation, industrial, and urban 
sectors that pay their tariffs (User Pay), share of surface water in the available water resources in 
the basin (Share SW) and governance of the RBO (Governing Body) are significant and their 
signs are as expected in all equations.
9  The variable Scarcity1 (i.e. ratio between rainfall and 
evapotranspiration) has a significant negative impact on the length of the decentralization 
process with basins facing higher scarcity
10 completing their decentralization processes faster 
than basins with more abundant water.
11  The variable Forms Dispute1 (i.e. number of forums 
that are available to hear/solve disputes) was significant in stimulating involvement of user 
groups in the process.  The Regime variable, with federal governance as benchmark, was 
negative and significant in all estimates, indicating that basins in federal countries have scored 
higher on various decentralization process indicators. 
5.4. The Decentralization Performance 
We present the estimated decentralization performance equations, using different estimation 
procedures and sets of explanatory and dependent variables (Table 5).  The estimated model 
equations display a robust set of results that support our hypotheses.  Fit and significant tests of 
                                                 
9 Given the nature of the 5 dependent variables we expect to have different signs of the same explanatory variable, 
depending on the equation. 
10 Notice that the lower the ratio of rainfall to evaporation, the higher the scarcity, so a negative sign of the scarcity 
coefficient in the equation reads as a higher level of scarcity. 
11 For example, scarcity forced the states sharing the Colorado River Basin to back away from their individual 
management of the water in the basin and look into a basin-wide management arrangement.  This observation 
doesn’t contradict our findings, as we asserted that the lowest appropriate level for decentralization of water 
resource management varies by the cases. 
18 the models suggest that all are significant at the 5 percent level (and better) in explaining the 
variation in the level of performance of the decentralization. 
  The main results in Table 5 suggest that the higher the share of the basin management 
budget that is provided from governmental sources external to the basin the higher is the level of 
the decentralization success.  Also, as expected, the level of the decentralization success is higher 
with an increase in the share of users that pay their tariffs.  These two finding suggest that 
success is associated with a combination of local self funding and central government support.  
The decentralization objective variable also suggests that the more comprehensive the set of 
objectives that decentralization reforms were supposed to address, the higher the level of 
success.  In addition, top-down initiation of decentralization reform was detrimental for success 
of the decentralization process.  The Regime variable, was negative and significant in all 
estimates, indicating that basins in federal countries have scored higher on various 
decentralization process indicators.  Basins in countries with unitary regimes exhibited inferior 
decentralization performance.  Finally, water scarcity level in the basin positively affected the 
success of the decentralization. 
5.5. The Interaction between the Decentralization Process and its Level of Performance 
In order to assess the impact of the decentralization process on the level of success, we estimated 
a couple of two-stage equation systems.  The first equation in each system depicts the 
decentralization process, as was described in the previous section, and the process variable is 
included as an instrumental variable in an equation that describes the decentralization 
performance.  Table 6 presents the results of a 2-SLS estimation procedure.  The value and 
direction of the coefficients are as expected and not significantly different than those presented 
for the single equation estimates (in tables 4 and 5).  Both systems are significant at a 1 percent, 
and the system Adjusted-R
2 is 0.65 and 0.24 for system 1 and 2, respectively.  
5.6. Channels of Impact 
The channels-of-impact analysis is presented in Table 7.  We refer to decentralization policy 
variables (e.g. Budget Spnt, Governing Body, Main Objectives), and contextual variables 
(Scarcity1, Share SW) and calculate impact of each variable on the decentralization performance 
in each equation system.  It is apparent that all variables perform very similarly across the two 
systems, except for Exist User Groups and WUAs Involvement that have an opposite impact in 
19 system 1 and 2, respectively.  An important finding is that the Main Objectives and the Budget 
Spnt policy variables have the highest impact (the former in both systems, and the latter in the 
second system), surpassing the contextual variables Scarcity1 and Share SW.  These findings 
imply that appropriate planning of the decentralization and its implementation policy could affect 
the level of certain variables (such as Main Objectives) while other variables (such as Share SW) 
are not affected by policy.  However, even in the latter case, careful policy could address issues 
associated with impact of Share SW and made it as effective as possible. 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The results of our econometric analyses suggest that both the process and the performance of 
decentralization in the sample basins are supported by our analytical framework and well 
explained by the set of independent variables we identified.  Several of these variables provide a 
robust explanation regardless of the equation selected and the estimation procedure used.  The 
results can also provide useful insights for policy makers who consider decentralization of river 
basins but have little or no experience.   
  The variables referring to the contextual factors and initial conditions significantly affect 
the nature of the decentralization process and its performance.  The starting point and level of the 
natural resource endowments in the basin matter a great deal; thus, where one stands dictates 
how one should implement the reform and how one may end up.  However, rich and well 
endowed basins do not necessarily have an advantage over less endowed basins.  Stressed 
resource conditions and the presence of multiple major problems can be stimulants to effective 
action and not only obstacles.  For example, water scarcity is an important variable that affects 
the process as well as the performance of decentralization.  As water in the basin is less abundant 
the incentives are greater for an effective decentralization process and a more successful 
outcome.  Scarcity is positively associated with several aspects of the decentralization process 
and its performance.  Indeed, the basin water scarcity variable is the most robust variable in the 
various analyses we conducted.  The presence of scarcity may therefore be a stimulus to reform, 
uniting the stakeholders in the basin.  This fits nicely with the notion of ‘Scarperation’ (Dinar 
and Dinar, 2005), that is, scarcity is also an incentive for cooperation among the parties sharing 
an international river basin.  In addition to water scarcity, the number and level of severity of 
water resource problems (e.g., quality) present in a basin prior to decentralization is an important 
20 factor in initiating effective decentralization reforms.  The more ambitious and nearly 
comprehensive the decentralization effort, and the greater the problems users faced, the more 
likely they were to see the effort as worthwhile and effective.   
  The results associated with the variables affiliated with the characteristics of the 
decentralization process suggest that indeed political economy plays a role in the decentralization 
process and affects its performance level, through both a need for compromise and increased 
transaction costs.  Sectorally diverse and ‘crowded’ basins do not necessarily have to face higher 
political cost and lower levels of reform performance, if appropriate mechanisms such as forums 
for dispute resolution and a coherent reform agenda are put in place.  Another important 
conclusion is that a longer decentralization process is not necessarily a negative outcome.   
Longer reform processes may yield some benefits such as better understanding and 
communication among stakeholder groups, higher rates of compliance with tariffs, and better-
established dispute resolution practices.  Also, dismantling of institutions during the 
decentralization process contributes to the performance of the decentralization process.  On the 
other hand, a decentralization process characterized by protracted political struggle leaves a 
negative impact on the decentralization performance. 
  Thus, it appears that complexity and conflict are distinct characteristics that work in 
opposite ways.  The mere presence of a larger number of organizations within a river basin, and 
the sheer length of time a decentralization reform takes, do not appear to be substantial negative 
factors.  On the other hand, highly conflicted decentralization processes are associated with 
poorer performance, and some elimination of previously existing institutional arrangements may 
be a positive factor.  Thus, what matters is not so much how complicated or lengthy the process 
is, but the degree of conflict and the ability to make organizational changes along the way.  As a 
consequence, the greater the political transaction costs associated with the decentralization 
process, the smaller the reported improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization.  
The longer the decentralization process took, the greater the extent of reported improvement 
between “before” and “after” decentralization.   
  Variables describing government-basin relationships, such as budget and funding by 
government agencies and the initiation of the reform process, are also consistent with our 
expectations.  The results suggest that continued central government financial support is often 
21 important and needed.
12  On the other hand, initiation of the decentralization process by central 
governments may be counterproductive and end in lower levels of reform performance.  In 
conclusion, government support for decentralization is beneficial, as long as it allows the 
stakeholders to initiate and lead the reform process. 
  Financial dimensions of decentralized river basin management are therefore both 
important and complex: success is associated with central government support as well as water 
user financial responsibility, and with revenues generated within the basin remaining in the 
basin.  Thus, it is the combination of financial responsibility (on the part of water users), 
financial autonomy (basin revenues remaining in the basin), and central government support that 
is associated with success, and not necessarily one element alone.  This is consistent with our 
analytical framework, which hypothesized that a configuration of factors that included a 
supportive but not controlling role for the central government, and responsibility but not 
complete independence for the water users in the basin, would be associated with successful 
implementation of decentralization reforms. 
  Our variables concerning basin-level institutional arrangements (such as user group 
presence, and budget sources and use) indicate the importance of water user organizations in 
setting the outcomes of decentralization reforms.  Involvement of such groups may make the 
process longer, but as noted, longer does not necessarily mean worse.  The results also provide 
additional support to the old ‘mantra’ that budgets that go back to the source have a positive 
impact on stakeholder involvement and system performance.  One interesting result is that basins 
with higher budget per capita are not necessarily more successful, reinforcing our findings above 
that success in river basin management is not necessarily confined to well-endowed basins. 
  The analysis in this paper can be useful in planning and designing decentralization of 
river basin management in that some of the variables involved in the process, have greater effects 
on the decentralization process and performance than others.  The share of the budget of the 
                                                 
12 River basin organizations with higher percentages of their budgets from external governmental sources (such as 
the local and federal governments) benefit from better stability and support and it shows in the performance of the 
decentralization process.  However, the same relationship does not hold for the budget share contributed by other 
outside sources. 
22 basin authority that is spent in the basin and the set of objectives associated with the 
decentralization process are the most important process-related variables, i.e., with the highest 
marginal impact values.  Since these are two variables that policy makers can affect in the design 
process, we paid special attention to them.  In addition there are contextual variables, such as the 
level of water scarcity in the basin and the share of surface water in the water resources used in 
the basin, with important effects that policy needs to take into account even if those matters are 
not within policy makers’ control. 
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Table 1: The Distribution of Responses by Continents 
Continent  Questionnaires  sent Responses Eliminated Retained in the data set 
Africa & Middle East  18  14  2  12 (66)
a 
Latin America  118  37  2  35 (30) 
North America  5  5  0  5 (100) 
East Asia-Pacific  7  7  3  4 (57) 
Europe 49  40  13  27  (26) 
Total 197  103  20  83  (42) 
a In parentheses are percent of retained questionnaires from the number that were sent. 
 Table 2. Share of Decision Making at Various Levels before and after Decentralization: 
Activity Before  After  t-value 
1. Administrative issues 
Basin level  0.06  0.32  4.32*** 
State level  0.12  0.10  -1.08 
Central government level  0.37  0.17  -5.68*** 
2. Infrastructure financing 
Basin level  0.02  0.08  3.17*** 
State level  0.14  0.17  2.82*** 
Central government level  0.45  0.33  -3.64*** 
3. Water quality enforcement 
Basin level  0.03  0.23  6.02*** 
State level  0.12  0.18  2.13** 
Central government level  0.44  0.14  -6.20*** 
4. Setting water quality standards 
Basin level  0.00  0.15  4.77*** 
State level  0.11  0.15  1.57* 
Central government level  0.53  0.35  -4.70*** 




29 Table 3: Shift in Responsibility of Various Functions before and after Decentralization 
Responsibility item  Before  After  t-value 
Water allocation  2.43  2.86  1.78* 
Water modeling and forecasting  2.21  3.28  2.98*** 
Water quality monitoring and enforcement  2.09  2.85  3.15*** 
Water tariff collection and enforcement  1.10  1.62  3.11*** 
a1=federal, 2=national agency, 3=state/provincial agency,4=regional organization, 5=local 
government, 6=river basin organization. 
Note:    *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
 
30 Table 4: Features of the Decentralization Process 
Estimation Procedure
a OLS  POISSON  GLM 







Budget Basn     1.456*** 
(7.08) 
Budget Spnt  -0.054 
(-0.98)    -0.497*** 
(4.45) 
Budget Srcs  -0.204*** 
(-2.49)    




Forms Dispute1  0.056** 
(2.26)    
Governing Body  -0.029* 
(-1.17) 
-0.461*** 
(-3.50)   
Main Objectives    0.268 







Sector Composition  -0.004 
(-0.11)    0.179*** 
(2.04) 
Share Sw  0.366*** 
(3.77)    








Log Pseudolikelihood    -306.18  -72.92 
F-test 54.48***     
Adjusted-R
2 0.465     
Wald Chi-square    23.09***   
Pseudo-R
2   0.344   
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
aEstimation procedure explaining Yrs Decentralization will use TOBIT as values are continuous 
between 0-100.  Estimation procedures explaining Instit Dismantled, Insit Created, and Political 
Cost will use GLM as these are string variables.  And estimation procedures explaining WUAs 
Involvement will use OLS as values are continuous and greater than 100. 










































































































































Procedure  GLM    OLS














Budget Extr  8.744*** 
(3.50)          0.255 
(1.11) 





(2.55)     
Budget Srcs    -0.280 
(-0.66)       
Exist User Groups    0.517*** 
(2.42)       
Forms Dispute1  1.446** 
(2.10)        
Governing Body    -0.032 
(-0.33)       













(2.10)     
Minor Objectives  0.147** 
(1.59)        










Problems Bfr      0.686***       (5.83) 














Sector Composition -2.426*** 
(-2.34)       -0.093 
(-0.77) 
Share SW  -4.055** 
(-1.82)    1.721* 
(1.59) 
1.522 
(1.43)     







(2.53)   
Yrs 
Decentralization    0.035*** 
(2.56)       
Pop  Density     2.6E-06* 
(1.70)    5.8E-07*** 
(4.39)   








F-test                12.35*** 4.47*** 15.84*** 4.03*** 6.11*** 2.69**
Adjusted R
2            0.485 0.220 0.193 0.311 0.320 0.232
Log  Likelihood  -271.69        
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
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Table 6: Results of 2SLS Estimated Equation System of Decentralization Process-Performance 
  System 1  System 2 
  WUAs 

























(-2.85)   
Exist User Groups    0.641*** 
(2.64)    
Forms Dispute1  0.062** 
(2.21)    0.067*** 
(2.49)   





(-1.36)   












Problems Bfr  0.015 
(0.93) 
0.743*** 
(6.63)    








Sector Composition  -0.017 
(-0.45)    -0.009 
(-0.25)   
Share SW  0.357*** 




WUAs Involvement    -2.03* 
(-1.77)    0.799 
(0.30) 
















System F-test  22.22***  3.95*** 
System Adjusted-R
2 0.648  0.237 
Note:    *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
 
 
 Table 7: Channels of Impact of Main Variables (absolute values)
a 
Variable  Total impact on Problems 
After  in System 1 
Total impact on Improved 
Responsibility in System 2 
Budget Spnt  -4.87×10
-2  2.42 
Governing Body  -6.58×10
-2 -3.00×10
-4 
Main Objectives  5.23×10




Share SW  1.24×10
-2  1.25 
aCalculations based on data in Table 6 and on equations [5]-[8] in the text. 
 
35 Figure 1: Cost and Share of Decentralization Investment Components in Water Resource 


































































36 Figure 2: Countries and Number of River Basins in the Analysis 
 
Note: the value next to the country name is the number of river basins in the dataset. 
37 Annex: Variables used in the analysis (In parentheses: Mean, Standard deviation, min
13, 
max); [In brackets: expected impact sign on process; on performance]. 
Budget Basn=V182.
14  The share of the basin’s budget obtained from basin stakeholders.   
(0.356, 0.391, 0.000, 1.000); [+;NA]. 
Budget Extr=V180.  The share of the basin’s budget allocated by external (government) agency.  
(0.190, 0.328, 0.000, 1.000); [NA;+]. 
Budget Per Cpita=V179/V11.  The budget per capita in the basin.  (0.292, 2.658, 0.000, 24.213); 
[+;+]. 
Budget Spnt=V184+V185+V186+V187.  The share of the budget that is spent in the basin and 
not returned to external governments.  (0.287, 0.474, -0.267, 1.370); [-;+]. 
Budget Srcs=PC(V180, V182, V183).
15  Share of budget from sources other than Government 
and Basin stakeholders.  (-0.115, 0.413, -0.713, 0.710); [-;-]. 
Exist User Groups=PC(V163, V164, V165).  Existence of irrigation, industrial and domestic 
user groups (measured as individually dichotomous variables) in the basin.  (0.871, 0.783, 0.000, 
1.731); [+;+]. 
Forms Dispute1=V44.  Number of forums that are available to hear/solve disputes.  (2.241, 
1.265, 0.000, 4.000); [+;+]. 
Governing Body=V31.  Higher values express more centralization: 5=Federal, 4=State 
Authority, 3=State owned company, 2=Regional Authority, 1=Regional 
Board/Council/Committee.  (3.566, 1.768, 0.000, 5.000); [-;-]. 
Improved Responsibility=PC(V146-V140, V147-V141, V148-V142, V149-V143, V150-V144).  
The difference between ‘after’ and ‘before’ decentralization regarding 5 types of management 
responsibilities ranging between federal to basin level.  (1.466, 3.639, -8.294, 9.217); [NA;NA]. 
Incremntal Improvement=PC(V91-V83, V92-V84, V93-V85, V94-V86, V95-V87, V96-V88).  
The incremental improvement in various issue problems in the basin between ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
decentralization.  (0.104, 0.518, -4.162, 0.728); [NA;NA]. 
Incremntal Tasks=PC(V118-V98, V199-V99, V122-V102, V123-V103, V126-V106, V127-
V107, V130-V110, V131-V111).  The incremental change in 8 variables related to tasks at local 
and basin-level management between ‘before’ and ‘after’ decentralization.  (0.128, 0.371, -2.671, 
0.762); [NA;NA]. 
Instit Created=V36. Number of new institutions that had to be created in the decentralization 
process (1.542, 1.262, 0.000, 3.000); [NA;NA]. 
Instit Dismantled=V35. Number of existing institutions dismantled in the decentralization 
process (0.627, 0.837, 0.000, 3.000); [NA;+]. 
Main Objectives=PC(V19, V20, V21).  The 3 main objectives of the RBO-conflict resolution, 
flood control, and water scarcity improvement.  (1.008, 0.692, 0.000, 1.731); [+;+]. 
Method Creation=V33.  The way the RBO was created (N/A=0, Bottom Up=1, and Top 
Down=2).  (1.193, 0.903, 0.000, 2.000); [-;-]. 
Minor Objectives=PC(V22, V23, V24).  The 3 minor objectives of the RBO-a combination of a 
set of 25 possible minor objectives.  (6.208, 8.791, 0.000, 33.972); [+;+]. 
                                                 
13 PC variables may have negative minimum values due to the process of their estimation 
14 Vxxx is the variable number that can be found in Dinar et al. (2005). 
15 PC=Principal Component variable. 
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Politcal Cost=V37.  The political/transaction cost of the decentralization process via the creation 
of new institutions (0 = none, 1=Low, …, 5=high).  (0.494, 0.942, 0.000, 5.000; [+,-]). 
Pop Density=V2/V10. persons per square kilometer.  (6567, 52970, 0.127, 480,000); [NA;+]. 
Problems Aftr=PC(V91, V92, V93, V94, V95, V96).  The composite success of decentralization 
(No response=1, Situation improved=4, Same situation=3, Situation worsen=2.  (5.837, 1.524, 
2.334, 8.967); [NA;NA]. 
Problmes Bfr=PC(V83, V84, V85, V86, V87, V88).  The composite level of problems in several 
domains: flooding, water scarcity, environmental quality, water conflicts, land degradation, 
development issues, measured on a scale of 1-4, with 4 being severe problems.  (6.871, 1.823, 
0.000, 9.750); [+;+]. 
Regime=Country’s regime (Dummy variable: Federal=0, Unitary=1).  (0.506, 0.503, 0, 1); [-;-] 
Scarcity1=V13/V14. The ratio between rainfall and evapotranspiration [millimeter/millimeter].  
(5.056, 27.965, 0.000, 246.679); [-;-]. 
Sector Composition=PC(V58, V59, V60, V61, V62).  The composition of the subsectors in the 
basin—irrigation, industry, domestic, hydropower, environment, which expressed as Y=1 if the 
sector exist, and N=0 if the sector doesn’t exist in the basin.  (1.257, 0.793, 0.000, 2.183); [?,-]. 
Sector Use Shares=PC(V66, V67, V68, V69, V70).  The distribution of water use shares of the 
five main water using sectors-irrigation, industry, domestic, hydropower and environment.   
(0.299, 0.768, -0.425, 6.609); [+;+]. 
Share SW=V75.  The share of surface water in the available water resources in the basin.   
(0.434, 0.381, 0.000, 1.000); [+,+]. 
Success Obj1=PC(V25, V26, V27, V28, V29, V30).  The integrated level of success of the three 
main decentralization objectives and the other 25 minor objectives, each measured on a scale of 
1-5 with 5 indicating high level of success.  (3.540, 7.814, 0.000, 63.510); [NA;NA]. 
Types Disputes=V46.  Main types of disputes/issues that usually need resolving (4.207, 2.934, 
0.000, 9.000); [-,?]. 
User Pay=PC(V169, V170, V171).  The percentage of users in the irrigation, industrial, and 
urban sectors that pay their tariffs.  (2.084, 13.990, 0.000, 127.886); [?;+] 
WUAs Involvement=V47.  The degree of WUA involvement and participation, expressed as a 
continuous variable on a scale between 0-100.  (0.26, 0.36, 0.000, 1.000 );[NA;+/-]. 
Year Creation=V18.  The year in which the RBO was created.  (1985.229, 18.486, 1926, 2002), 
[-;+/-]. 




NA means not applicable because it was not used as an independent variable. 
+/- means the impact depends on the dependent variable. 
 